The Metaphysics of Mattering

Can we philosophise about the things we care about?

Let us consider the concept of "mattering." In a discourse about what matters, it seems fitting to first explore the nature of mattering itself.

I propose the following definition:

(M) Something matters when it possesses significance sufficient to merit concern.

A Commonsense Worldview

This simple formulation invites deeper reflection. Two key ideas emerge:

Firstly, the belief that some things matter is fundamental to our common understanding of the world. It's how we intuitively perceive our environment before engaging in philosophical inquiry. Some philosophers dub this as the “common sense” view of the world - in other words, the assumption we carry prior to any logical or rigorous investigation beyond what we perceive.

Secondly, this pre-theoretical notion of mattering implies the existence of real, discoverable value in the world. This contrasts with more contemporary views suggesting that value is merely projected, constructed, or imagined.

From the perspective of commonsense, a diverse array of entities matter. Most prominently, we consider individuals to matter - our family members, friends, companion animals, and associates. Our major life goals and commitments also rank highly, as they orient us and imbue our existence with subjective meaning.

More abstractly, many believe that certain classes of beings matter intrinsically, such as humans, sentient creatures, or rational agents. Even inanimate objects can matter: revered artworks, monuments, historic buildings, cherished books, and family heirlooms often garner significant concern. Natural features like ancient trees, ecosystems, and geological formations are also frequently regarded as mattering.

This brief survey highlights an important point: there exists considerable disagreement about what matters, to what degree things matter, and which things matter intrinsically. Yet the very existence of such disagreements underscores our shared belief that some things do indeed matter.

The Metaphysics of Mattering

This belief in mattering manifests in our actions and moral judgments. We help our loved ones because they matter to us. We consider harming others wrong because we believe people matter. We would find it unconscionable to destroy historically significant sites for trivial reasons, as we deem such places to matter.

Of course, the belief that something matters does not necessarily mean it actually does matter. Perhaps nothing matters, as Nihilism posits. However, even if this were true, understanding our belief in mattering remains crucial to explaining human behaviour and motivation. If we believed “nothing mattered”, then while we might still act as if the objects of our own desires (whatever those might be) mattered, we would be deprived of any idea of having ends that ought to be pursued; of obligations that ought to be met. Additionally, nor would we have any sense of there being objectively “better” and “worse” desires to manage. There would be no difference between pursuing a worthwhile, satisfying career versus rotting in bed all day if this was the case.  Of course, there will be people who do not hold such distinctions, but these individuals are few and far between, with possible mitigating, neuropsychological factors influencing their perspectives. In other words, Nihilism is not the view of commonsense.

We need to be able to understand the bedrock to what it means to something mattering. When we say that something matters, then it matters either intrinsically or instrumentally.  If something matters intrinsically, this means that it matters in itself, rather than in virtue of acting in some kind of relation with something else.  On the other hand, if something matters instrumentally, then the “something” doesn’t carry this instrumentality, rather, we evaluate it only in virtue of its connection to something that does matter in itself (or that is instrumental). As this definition outlines instrumental mattering to be essentially linked to intrinsic mattering, I will not make much of the distinction between the two. So, delving deeper beyond these definitions, we can distinguish between two concepts:

Stance-Independent Mattering (SIM): The facts concerning mattering are fixed by reality, independent of anyone's beliefs, preferences, or attitudes.

Stance-Dependent Mattering (SDM): The facts concerning mattering are determined entirely by the beliefs, preferences, or attitudes of agents.

In the final analysis, only Stance-Independent Mattering (SIM) truly captures the essence of what it means for something to matter. This concept, while implicit in our earlier definition, is not necessarily presupposed by it. It's crucial to distinguish between what matters to someone and what objectively matters. We can, after all, be mistaken about what matters - consider extreme cases like Hitler’s idea of what was important to him, or more mundane examples, like someone who believes life's ultimate purpose is collecting Pokémon cards. These examples illustrate that mattering isn't merely a subjective mental state.

Take suffering, for instance. If suffering matters in a stance-independent sense, it's because something inherent to the experience of suffering itself - its unpleasantness or intrinsic negativity - provides a reason for our concern. Thus, SIM doesn't reduce mattering to mere psychological states.

Moreover, SIM doesn't suggest that we create or manufacture what matters. Rather, it allows for the possibility that some things matter regardless of anyone's beliefs or desires. If this aligns with our common-sense view of the world, then we're implicitly committing to SIM. Consequently, rejecting SIM means departing from this intuitive perspective, at least to some degree.

While this doesn't conclusively prove SIM's validity, it does offer some support. This follows from the philosophical principle that our common-sense commitments warrant prima facie justification.

Endorsing SIM as the true nature of mattering leads us to recognize its essential connection with Value Realism - the existence of stance-independent value. Without Value Realism, there would be no objective value in the world to determine what matters. In essence, SIM logically entails Value Realism.

To conclude, anyone adhering to a common-sense worldview must seriously consider the concept of mattering. We all operate as if some things matter, and more specifically, as if they matter in the way described by Stance-Independent Mattering (SIM): where facts about what matters are determined by reality, independent of anyone's beliefs, preferences, emotions, or attitudes.

This commitment to SIM, in turn, binds us to Value Realism: the existence of stance-independent value. Ultimately, this perspective allows for the possibility of being mistaken about what matters, as it posits that some things genuinely do matter - possessing intrinsic positive or negative value - while others do not.